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A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective
Philip A. Hamburger*
Did late eighteenth-century Americans understand the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the United States Constitution to provide individuals
a right of exemption from civil laws to which they had religious ob-
jections? Claims of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause
have prompted some of the Supreme Court's most prominent free
exercise decisions, and therefore this historical inquiry about a right
of exemption may have implications for our constitutional jurispru-
dence.' Even if the Court does not adopt late eighteenth-century
ideas about the free exercise of religion, we may, nonetheless, find
that the history of such ideas can contribute to our contemporary
analysis. The historical evidence concerning religious liberty in
eighteenth-century America is remarkably rich and consequently
can reveal analytical difficulties and solutions to which we should be
attentive when formulating our modern constitutional law.
The possibility that the Free Exercise Clause was understood in
the late eighteenth century to provide a constitutional right of reli-
gious exemption from civil laws has been examined by relatively few
* B.A. 1979 Princeton University; J.D., 1982 Yale Law School; Professor, Univer-
sity of Connecticut School of Law; Visiting Professor, 1991-92, National Law Center,
The George Washington University. The author gratefully acknowledges the generous
financial support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the helpful sugges-
tions of Richard S. Kay, James Lindgren, Ira C. Lupu, and William P. Marshall.
1. Exemptions were denied in the following cases: Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245
(1934); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Exemptions were created in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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scholars. Among these are Professors Michael J. Malbin and Ellis
West, who have relied upon the writings of a small number of fram-
ers, ratifiers, and other Americans to argue that the First Amend-
ment did not create a right of religious exemption. 2 Recently,
however, Professor Michael W. McConnell has, with great sophisti-
cation, presented the case for a contrary position, and he thereby
has created an opportunity to reexamine the issue.3 According to
Professor McConnell, the Free Exercise Clause may have originally
been understood to exempt individuals from civil laws to which they
had religious objections. In qualification, McConnell adds that the
First Amendment may have exempted only such noncompliance as
was peaceable and did not threaten important government inter-
ests.4 McConnell's work is particularly significant not only because
it takes a fresh view of the Free Exercise Clause but also because it
has implications for our historical understanding of America's writ-
ten constitutions: It suggests that American constitutions
subordinated civil law, whenever practicable, to each individual's
personal judgment about his or her higher obligations.
In fact, late eighteenth-century Americans tended to assume that
the Free Exercise Clause did not provide a constitutional right of
religious exemption from civil laws. 5 The first part of this Article
examines and calls into question McConnell's arguments that the
Free Exercise Clause may have created such a right. The second
part of this Article then considers more generally the history of a
right of religious exemption and shows the extent to which Ameri-
cans did not seek and even rejected such a right. Among other
things, the second part also suggests how Americans reconciled
their distaste for a right of exemption with their support for reli-
gious freedom. Of course, many Americans sympathized with their
2. MICHAELJ. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978); Ellis West, The Case Against a
Right to Religious-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 624 (1990).
For related perspectives on the constitutional question, see WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976); Phillip B. Kurland, The
Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court,
24 VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV.
933 (1989); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); G.R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (1985-86).
3. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]. McConnell
has developed his position in Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism].
As Professor Carol Weisbrod points out, we can ask historical questions about exemp-
tion other than the one pursued here. Professor Weisbrod, for example, examines the
different ways in which religious minorities are accommodated. Among other things,
she inquires whether legislation and judicial decisions are the means most commonly
used to meet the special needs of religious minorities. Carol Weisbrod, Comment on Curry
and Firmage Articles, 7 J.L. & RELIG. 315, 320-21 (1989).
4. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1461-62.
5. The term "civil law" here refers to the law emanating from civil, as opposed to
religious, authorities and relating to civil matters. So, too, "civil rights" here refers to
the rights under such civil law.
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neighbors who had pious scruples about oaths, military service, and
a few other legal requirements, and, therefore, in various statutes
and even state constitutions, Americans expressly granted religious
exemptions from some specified civil obligations. Americans did
not, however, authorize or acknowledge a general constitutional
right of religious exemption from civil laws.
I. McConnell's Evidence
Eighteenth-century Americans spoke and wrote extensively about
religious freedom and about government. Yet Professor McConnell
apparently cites no instance in which a late eighteenth-century
American explicitly and unambiguously said that an individual's
right to the free exercise of religion included a general right of
peaceable, religious exemption from civil laws-that is, from the
otherwise secular laws of secular government. 6 Instead, McConnell
argues that his thesis is a possible and even the most probable ex-
planation of a substantial body of other evidence.7 This part of this
Article examines McConnell's evidence and draws a contrary
conclusion.
8
6. The closest McConnell comes to this is an argument by Elias Boudinot for in-
cluding a militia exemption in the Bill of Rights. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at
1500. But see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
7. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1414.
8. Some of McConnell's evidence will not be examined here because it is only indi-
rectly pertinent to the question of what late eighteenth-century Americans thought
about exemptions. For example, McConnell recites at length some nineteenth-century
cases. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1503-11. Although interesting, this evi-
dence does not very directly inform us whether eighteenth-century Americans thought
there was or should be a constitutional right of religious exemption.
Nonetheless, a word should be added about some of McConnell's seventeenth-cen-
tury evidence. On the basis of the 1663 Rhode Island Charter and a few other charters,
McConnell constructs three arguments. First, McConnell points out that these charters
permitted colonists to pursue their religions notwithstanding English law to the con-
trary. Id at 1427. Yet the precise words of, for example, the Rhode Island Charter,
were that-notwithstanding any law to the contrary-persons may enjoy "theire own
judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments . . .; they behaving
themselves peaceablie." See 6 NATHAN O. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTrru-
TIONS 3213 (1909). England had various laws prohibiting certain religious meetings and
otherwise penalizing dissenters, and provisions like that of the Rhode Island Charter
merely freed colonists from complying with such laws, which restrained individuals "in
matters of religious concernments." Second, McConnell emphasizes that the charters
"limited the free exercise of religion only as necessary for the prevention of'Lycentious-
nesse' or the injury or 'outward disturbance of others,' rather than by reference to all
generally applicable laws." McConnell, Oigins, supra note 3, at 1427 (footnote omitted)
(quoting SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 117 (1986)).
For another interpretation, see the discussion of state constitutions infra text accompa-
nying notes 9-49. Furthermore, the word "licentiousness" was frequently used to refer
to immoral and, sometimes, merely prohibited behavior. WILLIAM ROBERTSON, PHRASE-
OLOGICIA GENERALIS 823-24 (1681). So too, "civil injury"-another term used by the
Rhode Island Charter, see 6 THORPE, supra, at 3213,-could refer to any injury under civil
19921 917
A. State Constitutions
McConnell finds support for his position in the religion clauses of
certain state constitutions, 9 and, because he describes these clauses
as his "strongest evidence,"' 10 they will be examined here in detail.
The clauses that interest him are those that acknowledged an indi-
vidual's right to the free exercise of religion or to freedom of wor-
ship but that added a caveat, such as, "provided he doth not disturb
the public peace."" According to McConnell, these caveats indi-
cate that the right of free exercise was understood to include a right
of exemption from religiously objectionable civil laws, except with
regard to nonpeaceable behavior. 12 This argument, however, de-
pends upon two assumptions: that the caveats concerned only
nonpeaceable behavior, and that the caveats limited the extent
rather than the availability of the right of free exercise. As it hap-
pens, both assumptions are mistaken. The caveats reflected a will-
ingness to allow government to deny the otherwise guaranteed
religious liberty to persons whose religious beliefs or actions
threatened the capacity of civil society to fulfill its functions.
The behavior described by the caveats included more than just
nonpeaceful behavior. A caveat that required persons to avoid dis-
turbing the "good order," "safety," or "happiness" of society or of
the state appears to have demanded a greater degree of obedience
than just peaceful behavior.' 3 Indeed, in Maryland, the caveat ex-
pressly mentioned persons who "shall infringe the laws of morality,
or injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights," and, in
New York and South Carolina, the caveats dealt with, among other
things, "acts of licentiousness."' 4 Even those caveats that men-
tioned only disturbances of the peace did not exclusively concern
acts of violence or force. According to long tradition, the criminal
offenses over which common law courts had jurisdiction were said
to be "contra pacem." Consequently, the phrase "contra pacem" be-
came associated with the notion of violation of law. Whereas Mc-
Connell assumes that a disturbance of the peace was simply
nonpeaceful behavior, eighteenth-century lawyers made clear that
"every breach of law is against the peace."' 5 Thus, the disturb-the-
law. Third, McConnell points out that the 1665 Carolina Charter authorized the propri-
etors to exercise the power of granting indulgences and dispensations. McConnell, Ori-
gins, supra note 3, at 1428. This is not, however, evidence that religious exemptions were
considered matters of constitutional right. In England in the 1680s, moreover, the dis-
pensing power was condemned as unlawful. J. R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1603-1689, at 230, 253-55, 289-91 (1971).
9. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1455-66, 1512; see also McConnell, Free Exer-
cise Revisionism, supra note 3, at 1117-18.
10. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 3, at 1118.
11. N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. I, art V.
12. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1461-62.
13. For a reproduction of many but not all of the caveats in state constitutions, see
id. at 1456-58. Note also the existence of various draft proposals, such as George Ma-
son's in Virginia and John Jay's in New York.
14. MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. 33; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXXVIII; S.C.
CONST OF 1790, art. VIII, § 1. For the word "licentiousness," see supra note 8.
15. Queen v. Lane, 6 MOD. 128, 87 ENG. REP. 884 (Q.B. 1704); see also 2 WILLIAM
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peace caveats apparently permitted government to deny religious
freedom, not merely in the event of violence or force, but, more
generally, upon the occurrence of illegal actions.
The caveats, moreover, described the availability rather than the
extent of the guaranteed religious freedom; instead of implying that
the right of free exercise was very extensive-that it permitted
peaceable departure from civil law-the caveats stated the condi-
tions upon which religious liberty could be denied.'6 This point can
be illustrated with particular clarity by the Revolutionary constitu-
tions of NewJersey, Delaware, and South Carolina.17 In these con-
stitutions, the caveats about peaceable behavior clearly related to
guarantees of equality or nondiscrimination rather than to the free
exercise or freedom of worship clauses. In NewJersey, article XVIII
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 8, § 38, at 40 (1726). Note that
eighteenth-century lawyers could distinguish "actual" breaches of the peace when they
wanted to.
Incidentally, this definition of a breach of the peace was recognized by Baptists who
pleaded for an expanded religious freedom. Dissenting ministers who opposed most
legislation with respect to religion and who insisted that individuals not be treated dif-
ferently on account of their religions frequently were accused of opposing the regula-
tion of morality. E.g., TIMOTHY STONE, A SERMON 24-25 (Conn. election sermon 1792)
(Evans 24820). In responding to such charges, dissenters pointed out that the state
could punish immoralities-peaceful and nonpeaceful-as breaches of the peace. For
example, after setting forth his strong stand on religious freedom, a Baptist, Caleb
Blood, explained:
This however, by no means prohibits the civil magistrate from enacting
those laws that shall enforce the observance of those precepts in the chris-
tian religion, the violation of which is a breach of the civil peace; viz. such as
forbid murder, theft, adultery, false witness, and injuring our neighbor,
either in person, name, or estate. And among others, that of observing the
Sabbath, should be enforced by the civil power.
CALEB BLOOD, A SERMON 35 (Vt. election sermon [1792]) (Evans 24126). After giving
an election sermon in which he argued against establishments, another Baptist, Samuel
Stillman, had to respond to complaints "'[t]hat upon the principles contained in the
sermon, the civil magistrate ought not to exercise his authority to suppress acts of im-
morality.'" SAMUEL STILLMAN, A SERMON 20 n.* (Mass. election sermon 1779) (Evans
16537). Stillman replied that his words had been misunderstood and that "[i]mmoral
actions properly come under the cognizance of civil rulers, who are the guardians of the
peace of society.... I beg leave to observe in the words of Bishop Warburton, 'That the
magistrate punishes no bad actions, as sins or offenses against God, but only as crimes
injurious to, or having a malignant influence on society.'" Id. (Of course, by quoting
Warburton-the bold defender of establishments-Stillman was taunting his critics.)
For establishment opinion about the peace of society or disturbances of the peace, see,
for example, Israel Evans' statement, quoted infra note 36;JOSEPH LYMAN, A SERMON 36
(Mass. election sermon 1787) (Evans 20469); DAVID PARSONS, A SERMON 13 (Mass. elec-
tion sermon 1788) (Evans 21360); WILLIAM WORTHINGTON, THE DUTY OF RULERS AND
TEACHERS 18 (Conn. election sermon 1744) (Evans 5524).
16. Of course, religious freedom could be denied in varying ways and in varying
degrees. For example, government could deny some civil rights to Protestant dissenters
and could deny even more civil rights to Catholics. For a justification of graduated re-
straints, see William Warburton, Alliance Between Church and State, in 7 WORKS 254-56
(Richard Hurd ed., 1811).
17. For other examples, see infra note 26.
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of the constitution concerned freedom of worship,' and article XIX
stated that:
no Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied the enjoy-
ment of any civil right, merely on account of his religious princi-
ples; but that all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any
Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves peaceably under the
government, as hereby established .... shall fully and freely enjoy
every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow
subjects.19
In Delaware, section 2 of the Declaration of Rights spoke of free-
dom of worship,20 and section 3 provided that Christians "ought...
to enjoy equal Rights and Privileges in this State, unless, under Col-
our of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, Happiness or Safety of
Society." 21 The South Carolina Constitution declared:
That all persons and religious societies who acknowledge that
there is one God, and a future state of rewards and punishments,
and that God is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely toler-
ated. The Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is
hereby constituted and declared to be, the established religion of
this State. That all denominations of Christian Protestants in this
State, demeaning themselves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy
equal religious and civil privileges. 2
2
Thus, in New Jersey, Delaware, and South Carolina, the caveats re-
lated to language concerning equality and nondiscrimination, not to
the language about free exercise, freedom of worship, or toleration.
The caveats stated the conditions under which government could
deny the religious freedom otherwise guaranteed.
Although not as clear as the New Jersey, Delaware, and South
Carolina constitutions, other state constitutions with disturb-the-
peace caveats are susceptible of similar interpretation. In these
other states, rather than pertain unambiguously to equality clauses,
the caveats related, or may have related, to the free exercise clauses.
Nonetheless, the caveats still should be understood to have stated
the conditions under which government could deny the promised
religious liberty. Americans repeatedly reminded one another in
sermons and pamphlets that individuals were "equally" free in the
state of nature and that "all" individuals in that condition and even
in civil society had a natural right to believe or worship as they
pleased. In this context, it is hardly surprising that American consti-
tutions tended to guarantee free exercise or freedom of worship to
all persons. 23 Similarly, constitutions provided other guarantees of
18. "That no person shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of the inestimable
privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience .. " N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. XVIII.
19. Id. art. XIX.
20. "That all Men have a natural and unalienable Right to worship Almighty God
according to the Dictates of their own Consciences and Understandings ..... DEL.
DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 2.
21. Id. § 3.
22. S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XXXVIII.
23. E.g., GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LVI ("[a]ll persons whatever"); MAss. CONST. OF
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religious liberty to all persons, Christians, or Protestants. 24 In con-
nection with these varied provisions, it is possible that the caveats
were understood to indicate the circumstances in which government
could deny religious freedom. For example, Georgia's constitution
said that "[a]ll persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their
religion; provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the
State."' 25 The second clause could have been a condition of the
availability of a relatively narrow right of free exercise rather than a
limitation on an otherwise very extensive right. In short, the theory
that the disturb-the-peace caveats evince a right of religious exemp-
tion fails to explain the Delaware, New Jersey, and South Carolina
constitutions; in contrast, the theory that the caveats permitted gov-
ernment to deny an otherwise guaranteed religious freedom ex-
plains the words of all early state constitutions.
It would seem, therefore, that the caveats set forth the conditions
under which government could deny a promised religious liberty-
the conditions under which government could restrict the availabil-
ity of such freedom. Of course, the caveats reveal that the religious
liberty guaranteed by American constitutions did not include the be-
havior described in the caveats. But the caveats did not in other
respects define the extent of religious liberty.
26
This interpretation-thus far based largely on the words of the
caveats-can be verified by the context in which the caveats were
written. Like Englishmen before them, Americans disagreed about
the circumstances in which government should be able to deny the
religious liberty otherwise guaranteed. It will be seen that Ameri-
cans took at least three broadly different positions on the availability
of religious freedom and that their variously formulated religion
clauses more or less reflected these three positions.
1780, art. II ("all men"); N.H. CONST. OF 1789, art. V ("[e]very individual"); N.C.
CONST. OF 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. XIX ("all men"); PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. II ("all
men"). Similarly, some state constitutions said that "no person" was to be denied free
exercise or freedom of worship. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. II; NJ. CONST. OF
1776, art. XVIII.
24. E.g., MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. 33; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXXVIII;
S.C. CONST. OF 1790, art. VIII, § 1.
25. GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LVI.
26. Further confirmation of this understanding of the caveats may be found in the
charters and drafts of constitutions that added caveats to clauses granting "toleration."
In 1776, George Mason proposed that "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the
exercise of religion ... unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate, unless, under
colour of religion, any man disturb the peace, the happiness, or safety of society or of
Individuals." 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 272, 277 & n.26 (W.V. Schreeven & R.L.
Scribner eds., 1983). For the New York debates concerning toleration, see infra text
accompanying notes 37-49.
Note, moreover, the chronological development of the religion clauses in, for exam-
ple, Georgia. The 1732 Charter and the 1777 Constitution had caveats. GA. CHARTER
OF 1732, in 2 THORPE, supra note 8, at 773; GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LVI. The 1789
Constitution did not.
1992]
The first approach made use of the ideas of John Locke. Some
Americans, drawing upon Locke, argued that government should be
able to discourage dangerous beliefs-that it should be able to deny
religious liberty not only to persons whose religious opinions
prompted actual violations of law but also to persons whose opin-
ions merely tended to have this effect. 27 In the words of a Vermont
minister,
every one has an undoubted right to choose that religion and
mode of worship which to him appears most agreeable to the
word of God, unless it be such as evidently tends to destroy civil
peace and government; in that case no one ought to be tolerated-
self-preservation forbids it.28
In accord with this approach, Georgia's constitution permitted
Georgia to deny religious freedom to persons whose religion was
"'repugnant" to the peace and safety of the state.29 Such was the
position Jefferson denounced in the preamble to his Act for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom:
[T]o suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field
of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of prin-
ciples on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy
... it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government,
for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order.30
As Jefferson understood, some Americans still assumed that govern-
ment had a right to restrain religious opinions it considered poten-
tially dangerous.
Many Americans repudiated the idea that a religious opinion
could be restrained merely on account of its bad tendency and
adopted, instead, a second approach: that government should be
able to deny religious liberty only to individuals who disturbed the
peace-who actually violated civil law. Taking a version of this ap-
proach, the Northwest Ordinance declared that "[n]o person
27. In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argued that "liberty of conscience is every
man's natural right," and that civil government had no authority to interfere with the
free exercise of an individual's natural right to worship as he or she pleased. Yet gov-
ernment could, according to Locke, deny toleration to any sect that espoused certain
opinions inimical to the preservation of civil society and government. JOHN LOCKE, A
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 50-52 (Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed. 1955) (1689). Other au-
thors also took versions of this position. See, e.g., WARBURTON, supra note 16, at 255-56;
VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 3, ch. 12, § 133, at 59 (1849).
28. GERSHAM C. LYMAN, A SERMON 12 (Vt. election sermon 1784) (Evans 18566).
He continued, "and we know that they have not the approbation of God, who under
pretense of serving him, would nullify his ordinance." The words "his ordinance" re-
ferred to the various biblical injunctions about submission to worldly rulers. In Balti-
more, the Rev. Bissett preached "that no Citizen ought, on account of his opinions
(unless they be evidently incompatible with the well-being of Society) to be denied pro-
tection, or debarred from the walks of civil eminence." JOHN BissErr, A SERMON, App.
at 8 (1791) (Evans 23208).
29. See text accompanying supra note 25.
30. 12 HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 85 (William
W. Hening ed., Richmond 1823) [hereinafter HENING, COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA].
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demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner shall ever be
molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments
in the said territory."' 3 1 Yet even this ameliorated type of caveat still
specified circumstances in which government could deny a person
the religious freedom he otherwise was guaranteed. As Oliver Ells-
worth explained,
In our country every man has a right to worship God in that way
which is most agreeable to his own conscience. If he be a good
and peaceable citizen, he is liable to no penalties or incapacities
on account of his religious sentiments: or in other words, he is
not subject to persecution.
3 2
If a person was not a good and peaceable citizen, he could be penal-
ized on account of his religion.
In contrast was a third position-taken by those constitutions that
did not qualify their guarantees of religious liberty.33 Some of the
constitutions that took this third approach not only omitted caveats
from their religion clauses but also included provisions condemning
the punishment of individuals "on account" of their religious be-
liefs.3 4 Similar to these constitutions was Jefferson's Act for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom. As seen above, the preamble to the Act
condemned at least the first approach; in addition, the body of the
Act stated that no man shall "suffer on account of his religious opin-
ions or belief."3 5 Thus, the Americans who abandoned the caveats
apparently recognized that the caveats were designed to allow the
punishment of individuals on account of their religion.3 6 Whereas
31. Northwest Ordinance, art. 1 (1787). Another version of this approach was sim-
ply to condition religious liberty on the behavior specified in the caveat. Even this more
general type of formulation, however, was drafted to enable government in the specified
circumstances to punish individuals on account of their religion.
32. Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder, CON. CoURAr, Dec. 17, 1787, in 14 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrIION 449 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see also ELNATHAN
WHITMAN, THE CHARACTER AND QUALIFICATIONS OF GOOD RULERS 24 (Conn. election
sermon 1745) (Evans 5714).
33. E.g., GA. CONST. OF 1789, art. 3, § 5; KY. CONST. OF 1792, art. 12, § 3; PA. CONST.
OF 1776, art. 2; VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 16.
34. E.g., KY. CONST. OF 1792, art. 12, § 4; PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. 2.
35. 12 HENING, COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 30, at 86.
Although the Act is well-known for having precluded an establishment, it clearly did
more than this.
36. As an anonymous Virginian wrote in 1777 of Christian sects that "quarrel" with
one another, "they ought to be punished, not as professors of religion, but as disorderly
members of the Commonwealth." THE FREEMAN'S REMONSTRANCE AGAINST AN EcCLESI-
ASTICAL ESTABLISHMENT 5 (1777) (Evans 43750) [hereinafter THE FREEMAN'S REMON-
STRANCE]. According to a New Hampshire minister,
when a man adopts such notions as, in their practice, counteract the peace
and good order of society, he then perverts and abuses the original Liberty
of man; and were he to suffer for thus disturbing the peace of the commu-
nity, and injuring his fellow-citizens, his punishment would be inflicted not
for the exercise of a virtuous principle of conscience, but for violating that
9231992]
McConnell asserts that the caveats reveal an expansive notion of
free exercise-including a right of exemption-in fact, the caveats
permitted discriminatory restrictions on the availability of religious
freedom and, for this reason, were condemned as intolerant.
The struggle over these three approaches can be observed in de-
tail in the convention that drafted New York's 1777 constitution and
particularly in the attempts ofJohnJay to obtain a caveat that would
permit the repression of Catholicism.3 7 The earliest extant draft
considered by the drafting committee, of which Jay was a leading
member, contained a religion clause apparently supported and
probably even written by Jay.38 Following the first approach de-
scribed above, the draft conditioned toleration upon the tendency
of opinions:
that free Toleration be forever allowed in this State to all denomi-
nations of Christians without preference or distinction and to all
Jews, Turks and Infidels, other than to such Christians or others
as shall hold and teach for true Doctrines, principles incompatible
with and repugnant to the peace, safety and well being of civil
society in general or of this state in particular[,] of and concerning
which doctrines and principles the legislature of this State shall
from time to time judge and determine.3 9
This proposal assumed that government should be able to treat
some religious beliefs as repugnant to the interests of civil society.
Although not expressly mentioned, Catholicism was the religion the
supporters of this language especially feared, for, according to many
eighteenth-century Protestants, Catholics believed they were not al-
ways obligated by their civil oaths and allegiances. The drafting
committee, however, rejected most of the anti-Catholic provision,
adopting instead the unqualified statement-illustrative of the third
approach-that "the free toleration of religious profession and wor-
ship shall forever be allowed to all mankind." 40
Not deterred, Jay resumed his efforts when the committee's draft
was discussed by the Convention on March 20, 1777. Following
universal law of rectitude and benevolence which was intended to prevent
one man from injuring another.
ISRAEL EVANS, A SERMON 7 (N.H. election sermon 1791) (Evans 23358).
37. This history of the religion clause of the 1777 New York Constitution is traced
by CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 541-45 (1906),
who prints the early drafts, andJOHN W. PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY 87-
88 (1967).
38. Jay probably participated in preparing the draft, even if it is not written in his
hand. See LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 495-99; PRArr, supra note 37, at 83, 86.
39. See LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 541. The draft continued, "and further that as the
Prevalence of Religion and Learning greatly contributes to the Happiness & Security of
the people of every free State, the legislature of this State ought shall to afford them all
proper encouragement." Id. Following the word "State" in the text, a marginal inser-
tion added the words: "in religious Profession and worship to all mankind." Id.
40. 1 JOURNALS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, PROVINCIAL CONVENTION, COMMITrEE
OF SAFETY AND COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 844 (1842) [hereinafter
JOURNALS]. This language, from the Convention's Journal, may not have been an exact
quotation of the committee's proposal. A slightly earlier draft said: "That the free exer-
eise Toleration of religious profession and worship be forever allowed within this state
to all mankind." See LINCOLN, supra note 37, at 541.
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closely the language of his earlier proposal, he moved that the com-
mittee's religion clause be qualified as follows: "Provided neverthe-
less, that nothing in this clause contained, shall be construed to
extend the toleration of any sect ... who inculcate and hold for true
doctrines, principles inconsistent with the safety of civil society, of
and concerning which the Legislature... shall... judge and deter-
mine."'41 This attempt to reinstate a version of his original measure
gave rise to "[m]any debates," and therefore Jay withdrew his
amendment and substituted an addition to the religion clause that
expressly denied religious liberty to Catholics. 42 Again, he was dis-
appointed-losing in a vote of 19 to 10.
4
3
At this point, Jay called for a postponement of further discussion
so that he and other anti-Catholics could prepare a compromise po-
sition. Having failed to obtain approval of any of the Lockean or
more expressly anti-Catholic formulations of the religion clause, Jay
and other anti-Catholic framers shifted their focus from the religion
clause to that concerning naturalization. In the words of the histo-
rian John W. Pratt, "the anti-Catholic group ... altered its tactics";
it "decided to achieve the proscription of Catholics by means of a
naturalization oath for aliens." 44 Therefore, on March 21, when the
Convention returned to its consideration of the religion clause, Jay
was ready to compromise, and he moved that there be added to the
religion clause a somewhat less severe caveat: "provided that the
liberty of conscience hereby granted, shall not be construed to en-
courage licentiousness, or be used in such manner as to disturb or
endanger the safety of the State."
45
Yet even Jay's compromise proposal was insufficiently tolerant in
the view of many members of the Convention, for it was ambigu-
ous-it could be understood to refer not only to illegal actions but
41. 1 JOURNALS, supra note 40, at 844.
42. Id. This had the political advantage of clearly not threatening any Protestants.
The substitute stated:
Except the professors of the religion of the church of Rome, who ought not
to hold lands in, or be admitted to a participation of the civil rights enjoyed
by the members of this State, until such time as the said professors ... swear,
that they verily believe in their consciences, that no pope, priest or foreign
authority on earth, hath power to absolve the subjects of this State from
their allegiance to the same. And further, that they renounce and believe to
be false and wicked, the dangerous and damnable doctrine, that the pope, or
any other earthly authority, have power to absolve men from sins....
Id. Note that a less bigoted oath could be acceptable to some English Catholics. In the
1780s, the Catholic Committee of England attempted to obtain relief from the penal
laws by proposing an oath with which Catholics would have "protested" against certain
doctrines commonly attributed to them. To the Catholics of England [Circular Letter of the
Catholic Committee to the Catholics of England] (Nov. 25, 1789). The substantial com-
promises proposed by the Committee were not acceptable to the Church.
43. 1 JouRNALS, supra note 40, at 844.
44. PRATr, supra note 37, at 87.
45. 1 JOURNALS, supra note 40, at 845.
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also to dangerous opinions.46 On this ground, Gouverneur Morris
challenged Jay's motion by asking whether it was not substantially
the same as Jay's proposal that was withdrawn.47 The Convention,
however, considered the proposals to be different. Therefore, Rob-
ert Livingston moved to substitute in place of Jay's compromise
amendment a caveat that carefully referred only to actions: "pro-
vided that this toleration shall not extend to justify the professors of
any religion in disturbing the peace, or violating the laws of the
State." 48 In other words, to forestall Jay's compromise proposal,
Livingston was willing to give up the unqualified guarantee of toler-
ation that the committee had reported to the Convention, but, if
there had to be a caveat, Livingston wanted it to refer to unlawful
acts rather than dangerous opinions.
In the end-after a temporary victory by Jay-both sides had to
compromise further. On April 1, upon a motion by Morris, the
Convention unanimously adopted what became the Constitution's
caveat to its guarantee of religious freedom: "Provided that the lib-
erty of conscience hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of this State." 49 A final compromise, the Morris
proposal mentioned acts and practices but employed some of Jay's
formulation.
This detailed account of the evolution of New York's religion
clause reveals that Americans formulated the caveats in their reli-
gion clauses in a way that reflected their three main positions on the
availability of religious freedom. To allow government to deny reli-
gious freedom with respect to what they considered dangerous be-
liefs, Jay and other anti-Catholic framers insisted upon a caveat
relating to belief or, at least, Catholicism. In response, Morris, Liv-
ingston, and other relatively tolerant framers had to compromise:
They abandoned the Committee's unqualified religion clause and
attempted to limit Jay's caveat so that it would only concern unlaw-
ful acts. Far from reflecting a right of exemption, the various cave-
ats indicated the circumstances in which government could deny the
religious freedom otherwise guaranteed by a constitution.
B. James Madison
McConnell focuses his discussion of the framers on the writings of
Madison. Yet even Madison did not believe that the right of free
exercise included a right of religious exemption from civil laws. 50
46. PRAtrr, supra note 37, at 88.
47. 1 JOURNALS, supra note 40, at 845.
48. Id.
49. Id- at 860. The Constitution varied from the Morris proposal in its punctuation.
The Constitution's provision was largely copied by South Carolina. S.C. CONST. OF
1790, art. VIII, § 1. It was unusual in its inclusion of the phrase "shall not be con-
strued," which had been part ofJay's proposal and was left in place by Morris' amend-
ments. Although the phrase was better suited to Jay's proposal than Morris', it clearly
did not imply a right of exemption.
50. Although McConnell describes Jefferson's views, McConnell acknowledges that
such opinions do not support his argument. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1451-
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First, McConnell considers it significant that Madison and others
in 1776 objected to the use of the word "toleration" on the ground
that the exercise of religion was a right.51 According to McConnell,
Madison's insistence that the exercise of religion was a right was a
demand for an expanded religious liberty, possibly including a right
of exemption. 52 Yet if this was what Madison was claiming, why did
he not say so? Perhaps he meant only what he said-that the free
exercise of religion was a matter of right rather than of toleration or
grace. Even if, however, Madison's objection did concern the extent
of religious liberty, there is no reason to think that the right of free
exercise was a right of exemption from civil laws. Indeed, there is
reason to believe the contrary. By the 1770s, not only dissenters but
also many supporters of religious establishments agreed that indi-
viduals had a natural right to the free exercise of religion.53 More-
over, during the first decade of Independence, a majority of state
constitutions provided for some form of establishment, yet only one
state constitution, that of South Carolina in 1776, still spoke of "tol-
eration" rather than a "right" of religious freedom. 54 It is unlikely
that individuals and states unwilling to eliminate establishments
were content to exempt each dissenter from the civil laws to which
he or she had religious objections.
Second, McConnell argues that Madison's support for an express
military exemption in the federal Bill of Rights implies that Madison
believed the free exercise of religion included a general right of reli-
gious exemption from civil laws. 55 Yet other conclusions at least as
probable as McConnell's can be drawn from Madison's proposal of
a military exemption: For example, Madison may have assumed that
a conscience or free exercise clause would not provide any right of
exemption. Nor do the positions of Madison's colleagues in the
congressional debates about the Bill of Rights support McConnell's
52. Indeed, Jefferson wrote to Madison: "The declaration that religious faith shall be
unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated by religious error." Letter
to James Madison, (July 31, 1788), in 13 THOMAS JEFFERSON, PAPERS 442-43 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1956). McConnell does discuss the minimal amount of evidence surviving
from the debates concerning the framing and ratification of the Bill of Rights, McCon-
nell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1511, but he does not, except with regard to Jefferson and
Madison, examine much other evidence relating to the positions of individual framers
and ratifiers.
51. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1462.
52. Id. at 1443.
53. See infra notes 82-85
54. See 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 444 (1964).
The pressures that encouraged this uniformity of rhetoric included the efforts of dis-
senters. For example, in 1775, the Warren Association informed the Massachusetts As-
sembly that a freedom from religious taxation "is not a mere favor, from any man or
men in the world, but a right and property granted us by God." See id. at 309. On the
abandonment of the toleration language in New York, see PRATr, supra note 37, at 89.
55. McConnell, Or'gins, supra note 3, at 1454.
1992] 927
view of Madison. Of the representatives whose contributions were
recorded, some supported a constitutional right to a military ex-
emption-although only one did so explicitly on grounds of con-
science. 56 Some, however, opposed such an exemption. 57 None are
recorded as even discussing a general constitutional right of exemp-
tion. Moreover, the House proposal for the Bill of Rights included,
in addition to a "free exercise" clause, a provision for "rights of
Conscience" and a provision for a military exemption-both of
which were removed by the Senate.58 What any of this implies
about the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause is speculative. Ar-
guably, it suggests that the Free Exercise Clause, by itself, was not
thought to create an exemption from civil laws.
59
Third, McConnell finds evidence in Madison's rewriting of the
religion clause of the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights.60 Madison's pro-
posal, which included a disturb-the-peace caveat, was broken by
semicolons into three clauses. The first clause ended by declaring
that "all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of
[religion] accord[ing] to the dictates of Conscience." 61 The second
added: "and therefore that no man or class of men ought on ac-
count of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privi-
leges." 62 According to the third clause, "nor [ought men on
56. Boudinot "wish[ed] that in establishing this government we may be careful to let
every person know that we will not interfere with any person's particular religious pro-
fession. If we strike out this clause, we shall lead such persons to conclude that we mean
to compel them to bear arms." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY REC-
ORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 199 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS]. Even this statement hardly indicates that Boudinot
or others thought a free exercise of religion required a right of religious exemption from
military service, let alone exemption from civil laws in general.
57. Most dramatically, Representative Benson said: "'No man can claim this indul-
gence of right. It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, and therefore
ought to be left to the discretion of the government.'" Id. at 184. McConnell attempts
to explain this by pointing out that Benson also said it would be difficult to formulate
any such exemption. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1502. Moreover, McConnell
argues that Benson may have believed "there is no natural right to exemption from
militia service because the government's interest is potentially compelling and the de-
gree of necessity for universal military service must be left to legislative discretion." Id.
Yet this is hardly what Benson said. For Benson, as for so many eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century men, a natural right appears to have been a portion of the liberty existing
in the state of nature. Opinion against a military exemption is apparent in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 183, 198.
58. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, at 46. Also, during the ratifica-
tion debates, many Anti-Federalists argued for a bill of rights that would include both a
free exercise clause and a military exemption. For some of the demands for a military
exemption, see 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 509, 638; 13 id. at 60, 252-53,
513, 540; 16 id. at 419.
59. The surviving debates about the Free Exercise Clause are remarkable chiefly for
their meagerness. As McConnell notes, "[tihe recorded debates in the House over these
proposals cast little light on the meaning of the free exercise clause." McConnell, Ori-
gins, supra note 3, at 1481.
60. Id. at 1462-63.
61. 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, supra note 26, at 457.
62. Id.
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account of religion be] subjected to any penalties or disabilities un-
less, under [colour of religion, any man disturb the peace, happi-
ness, or safety of society]." 63 This language conforms to the pattern
observed in other state constitutions; the last clause clearly does not
relate to the first and therefore does not imply that the first pro-
vided a right of exemption.
C. Exemptions from Particular Civil Obligations
Both before and after the adoption of constitutions guaranteeing
the free exercise of religion, legislative and constitutional docu-
ments (including charters) granted exemptions from particular obli-
gations, such as oaths, conscription, and assessments. McConnell
suggests that when legislatures and other bodies created these ex-
emptions they were attempting to reflect a free exercise right of ex-
emption.64 Yet legislators equally may have been showing their
sympathy for Quakers and others whose piety prevented their con-
formity to law. As McConnell concedes, the issue whether an indi-
vidual was understood to have a general constitutional right of
religious exemption from civil laws is hardly the same issue as
whether statutes or, occasionally, constitutions granted exemptions
with respect to a few specific matters. 65
63. Id The words within the last set of brackets are implied by an "&c" and are
taken from the text to which Madison's language was to be an amendment.
64. ,McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1466. Typically, these specialized exemp-
tions were granted by legislative bodies. Some, however, were secured in state constitu-
tions. For example, in Pennsylvania a person "conscientiously scrupulous of bearing
arms" was exempted from "personal service" if he would pay "an equivalent." PA.
CONST. OF 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS, § VIII. According to John Bissett,
Government holds itself justifiable in overruling the scruples of those who
think it unlawful to contribute for the support of a defensive war, and of
courts ofjustice; and that liberty of conscience, in the extent to which some
carry it, must, in many instances, be infringed by a power, the object of
whose operations is the good of the whole. But this answer [of government]
I propose, rather than defend; having a respect for religious scruples, how-
ever seemingly groundless; and being satisfied that a scheme can be devised
in which these difficulties may be obviated.
How then is the object to be accomplished? -This is a question the solu-
tion of which properly belongs to Legislative Wisdom ....
BxssErr, supra note 28, app. at 12. See also id. app. at 16, where Bissett employs the
argument he here says he is not defending.
Incidentally, as Carol Weisbrod has discussed, claims of exemption can be accommo-
dated "by a rule broad enough to include the particular practice." Weisbrod, supra note
3, at 316. The United States Constitution's clause concerning oaths or affirmations is an
excellent example. U.S. CONST. art. VI. To the extent it was regarded as a civil law, it
reflected a concession to those who wanted exemptions from civil laws, but the conces-
sion was made by altering a general requirement rather than by granting an exemption.
65. On the whole, legislatures appear to have assumed they had a right to grant
military exemptions-at least if the exemptions did not specify a particular religion.
Nonetheless, the right of legislatures to grant even such generally available exemptions
could be challenged on the basis of demands that civil rights be equal rather than depen-
dent upon an individual's religion. For example, after the 1776 Virginia Convention
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At least one of McConnell's examples, the assessment system, in-
volved exemptions, not from civil laws, but from laws relating to
religion.66 The assessments were state taxes levied to support reli-
gion. Many persons, including substantial numbers who were mem-
bers of the supported church or churches, objected to having to
provide such support, but at least dissenters could attempt to get
legislative exemptions for their sects or, under some systems, had
the right to have their contributions channelled to their own sects.
Therefore, McConnell describes these assessment laws as contain-
ing exemptions and suggests that they reflected a constitutional
exempted Quakers and Mennonites from militia duties, the Committee of Frederick
County complained "that they have a tender regard for the Conscientious Scruples of
every religious Society but at the same time beg leave to represent the injustice of sub-
jecting one part of the Community to the whole burthen of Government while others
equally share the benefits of it." 7 REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, supra note 26, at 549.
Among other things, the Committee urged that Quakers and Mennonites either be sub-
ject to the "same fines" as other Americans for their failure to serve or be required to
provide substitutes. Id at 548-49. The Committee further asked if it "would not be
reasonable to allow any person who should choose to contribute to the support of the
public in lieu of attending Musters the same indulgence as to those who refuse from
conscientious principles." Id. at 549. A few weeks later, the Convention required that
the scrupulous were to be included in the militia but were not "obliged to attend general
or private musters." Id. at 553 (quoting 9 Va. Stat. 139).
In Maryland, the small number of Mennonites and "Dunkers" were exposed to popu-
lar violence on account of their refusal to bear arms. James 0. Lehman, The Mennonites of
Maryland During the Revolutionary War, 50 MENNONrrE Q. REV. 200, 205-07 (1976). The
Provincial Convention granted an exemption to "such persons who from their religious
principles cannot bear arms in any case," but this hardly put an end to the resentment.
Id. at 208. Some military companies threatened to pull down the houses of conscien-
tious objectors; other companies, it was thought, might refuse to fight. Id at 209. The
Committee of Correspondence "feared for the safety of the pacifists," as did the pacifists
themselves, who, under these pressures, said they would pay amounts in lieu of service.
Id.
Similar events occurred in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, where members of the
Church of the Brethren and other pacifists reluctantly paid what one of them called"'protection money,' " because "[t]here seemed to be no other alternative than to give
something in order to be safe." Richard K. MacMaster, Neither Whig nor Tory: The Peace
Churches in the American Revolution, 9 FIDES ET HISTORIA 14 (1977). Money paid as a sub-
stitute for military service could be disguised as contributions "for the needy," but, in
fact, often was paid for protection from mob violence.
When Quakers complained about threats to their liberty of conscience guaranteed by
Pennsylvania's charter, the sixty-six members of the Philadelphia Committee of Safety
unanimously presented a response to the Speaker of the House. Id. at 16. The Officers
of the Military Association of the City and Liberties of Philadelphia petitioned the
Assembly:
We cannot alter the Opinion we have ever held with Regard to those parts of
the Charter quoted by the Addressors, that they relate only to an Exemption
from any Acts of Uniformity in Worship, and from paying towards the Sup-
port of other religious Establishments, than those to which the Inhabitants
of this Province respectively belong. We know of no Distinctions of Sects,
when we meet our Fellow Citizens on Matters of Public Concern, and ask
those conscientiously scrupulous against bearing Arms, to contribute toward
the Expence of our Opposition, not because of their religious Persuasion, but
because the general Defence of the Province demands it.
Id. at 17.
For an interesting nineteenth-century criticism of exemptions developed by the judici-
ary, see HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 420-21 (1814).
66. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1470-71.
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right of religious exemption from civil laws. 67 Yet it remains un-
clear why exemptions from laws respecting religion should be un-
derstood to reveal much about a right of exemption from laws
concerning civil matters. 68
D. The Role of the Judiciary
McConnell's argument appears to assume that late eighteenth-
century Americans, at least by 1789, were content to have the judici-
ary evaluate the existence of conscientious objections and even to
have the courts weigh such objections against the needs of govern-
ment.6 9 According to McConnell, religious conscience was not un-
derstood to justify nonpeaceful behavior-nor even a peaceful
departure from a civil law, when the government had a compelling
interest in uniform application.70 With respect to a peaceful depar-
ture from civil law, the judiciary, indicates McConnell, was expected
to weigh the interest of divinely inspired conscience against the in-
terests of civil government.7
1
Although McConnell does not cite framers, ratifiers, or other
Americans on the subject ofjudicial discretion, there is considerable
evidence concerning late eighteenth-century perceptions of the ju-
diciary, and it does not support McConnell's view of a right of reli-
gious exemption. In the framing and ratification debates, for
example, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists repeatedly said that
the written constitution should delineate with precision the extent
of federal power and that federal judges should not be left with
vague rules that might become sources of judicial discretion. 72 In-
deed, the Anti-Federalist insistence on clear, written limitations was
of primary importance among the demands that gave rise to the Bill
of Rights. 73 Thus, it is improbable that the framers and ratifiers of
the Bill of Rights deliberately adopted a balancing test as the stan-
dard of individual religious liberty and federal power when these
were in conflict.
74
67. Id at 1471.
68. McConnell largely acknowledges that the assessments were laws relating to reli-
gion. Id. at 1470-71. Of course, members of establishments defended such laws as re-
lating exclusively to civil concerns, but dissenters who demanded exemptions or the
abandonment of assessments clearly held otherwise.
69. Id at 1445, 1502, 1512.
70. Id at 1461-62.
71. Id at 1445.
72. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 302-25 (1989) (and works cited therein).
73. Id at 313-14.
74. Incidentally, for the opinion of Backus on judicial discretion in connection with
exemptions, see ISAAC BACKUS, The Sovereign Decrees of God, in IsAAc BACKUS ON CHURCH,
STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, at 295 (William G. McLaughlin ed.,
1968) [hereinafter BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM]. Backus was a leading
Baptist advocate for an expansion of religious liberty in America.
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More generally, in the eighteenth century, the judiciary was un-
derstood to be as much a branch of civil government as the legisla-
ture. If individuals had a religious liberty that could exempt them
from civil authority, they could claim exemption from judicial as
well as legislative actions. Thus, for example, when a small Con-
necticut sect, the Rogerenes, breached civil laws, they were willing
to defy the courts. 75 Persons claiming a right of religious exemption
from civil law had no reason to stop at the courthouse door.
II. A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption
in the Eighteenth Century?
A review of McConnell's evidence has suggested reasons to doubt
whether Americans thought the First Amendment provided a consti-
tutional right of religious exemption from civil laws. It remains nec-
essary, however, to examine more generally Americans' attitudes
toward such a right. Although Americans frequently said religious
freedom was based on an authority higher than the civil government
and that the exercise of religion could not be submitted to civil au-
thority, does this mean that they sought a religious or constitutional
right of exemption from civil laws? On the basis of evidence chiefly
from Madison, Mason, and Jefferson, Professor Michael Malbin has
concluded that the First Amendment was not understood to give a
right of religious exemption. 76 Professor Ellis West has supple-
mented Malbin's account with evidence from two notable dissenters,
John Leland and Isaac Backus. 77 In the discussion that follows, it
will be seen that there is much eighteenth-century evidence on the
question, although only a selection of the evidence can be examined
in this brief space.78 What is presented, however, will suggest, first,
that the free exercise of religion tended not to be considered a par-
ticularly extensive or radical claim of religious liberty-indeed, it
was a freedom espoused not only by dissenters but also by establish-
ments. Second, when advocating religious freedom-even a reli-
gious freedom broader than mere free exercise-dissenters who
were politically active and influential in lobbying for expanded reli-
gious liberty79 did not seek a constitutional right of exemption from
75. For a discussion of the Rogerenes, see infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
For their willingness to defy the courts, see JOHN R. BOLLES & ANNA B. WILLIAMS, THE
ROGERENES; SOME HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED ANNALS BELONGING TO THE COLONIAL His-
TORY OF CONNECTICUT (1904).
76. MALBIN, supra note 2, at 19-37.
77. West, supra note 2, at 624.
78. Among the richest and most accessible sources for this Article are eighteenth-
century election sermons. These were the product of New England, and therefore my
New England evidence often is far more detailed than that from other regions. The
evidence from different regions, however, is relatively consistent on the question ex-
amined here. Incidentally, note that the struggle for religious freedom could elicit co-
operation among members of sects in very distant parts of America. For example, in
1774, Isaac Backus sought assistance for the Baptist cause in Massachusetts. In 1775,
the Philadelphia Baptists publicized this. Among others, the Baptists of Charleston,
South Carolina, sent money. See JOHN W. BRINSFIELD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN COLO-
NIAL SOUTH CAROLINA 84 (1983).
79. To be more precise, expanded general guarantees of religious freedom.
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objectionable civil laws. Third, a right of exemption may have been
considered a "law respecting religion" and may have been under-
stood to create "unequal civil rights"-precisely what many dissent-
ers considered attributes of establishment and sought to abolish.
A. Free Exercise
Although eighteenth-century Americans discussed the free exer-
cise of religion in language that may, to twentieth-century lawyers,
seem dramatic, by the last half of the eighteenth century, the notion
of free exercise according to conscience was hardly a radical idea.
Increasing numbers of eighteenth-century Americans asserted that
an individual's relationship to the divine being was a matter of con-
science and entirely personal.8 0 This individualism was reflected
not only in discussions of religion but also in the political analysis
based on assumptions about the state of nature. According to the
Lockean version of that analysis, the free exercise of religion was a
right existing in the state of nature.8 1 It was dictated by personal
conscience or judgment and therefore was not-and could not be-
submitted to civil government.
Yet the right of free exercise was by no means a politically ex-
treme idea or an idea that fully embodied the claims of dissenters
seeking an expansion of religious freedom. The notion that each
individual had an inalienable natural right to the free exercise of
Quakers and Mennonites, for example, were not, during the last half of the eighteenth
century, typically among the dissenters who were influential in obtaining such
guarantees.
80. For example, in Massachusetts, dissenters petitioned that "God hath given to
every Man an Unalienable Right in Matters of His Worship to Judge for himself as his
Conscience reserves ye Rule from God." 1749 petition to the Mass. Assembly from the
Separate congregations in 17 towns, in 1 STOKES, supra note 54, at 422. Isaac Backus
asserted: "In civil states particular men are invested with authority to judge for the
whole; but in Christ's kingdom each one has an equal individual right to judge for him-
self." ISAAC BACKUS, A Fish Caught in His Own Net, in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND
CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 198; see also id. at 332, 335. The Presbyterians of Virginia
declared that:
Religion is altogether personal, and the right of exercising it unalienable;
and it is not, cannot, and ought not to be, resigned to the will of the society
at large; and much less to the legislature, which derives its authority wholly
from the consent of the people, and is limited by the original intention of
civil associations.
Memorial of the Presbyterians of Virginia to the General Assembly (Aug. 13, 1785), in AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS 113-14 (William A. Blakely ed., 1911). Israel Evans preached: "As the
conscience of man is the image and representative of God in the human soul; so to him
alone it is responsible." EVANS, supra note 36, at 6. According to Samuel Shuttlesworth,
"as piety and our mode of faith are matters only between GOD and our own souls, we
ought to be amenable to no human tribunal; but only answerable to GOD and our con-
sciences." SAMUEL SHUTTLESWORTH, A DISCOURSE 14 (Vt. election discourse 1792) (Ev-
ans 24788). To Samuel Stillman, religion was a "right of private judgment"; it was a
matter "in which every man is personally interested; and concerning which every man
ought to be fully persuaded in his own mind." STILLMAN, supra note 15, at 25.
81. For a discussion of Locke, see supra note 27.
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religion according to conscience appealed not only to dissenters but
also, by the time of the Revolution, to many supporters of establish-
ments, who often were content to include free exercise and freedom
of worship clauses in state constitutions. 82 The idea of free exercise
allowed supporters of establishments to refute charges of intoler-
ance and persecution. They could point out that-notwithstanding
state support for a particular sect or for Christian religion-all citi-
zens could freely exercise their own religion.83 Thus, even many
82. See, e.g., MD. DECL. OF RIGsS OF 1776, § 33; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. II; N.H.
CONST. OF 1784, art. V; VA. BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 16.
83. Evidence of such arguments is particularly rich for the strong and sophisticated
establishments in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Amos Adams of Massachusetts
preached: "Blessed be God for the writing of Lock [sic], and other learned men, who
have so effectually exposed the iniquity and absurdity of persecution for religious opin-
ions." AMos ADAMS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AN INVALUABLE BLESSING 30 (1768) (Evans
10810). He also said: "[O]ur fathers obtained... a grant of this country, with such full
liberty of conscience." Id. at 32. In a Massachusetts election sermon, Simeon Howard
said the people should invest their rulers with the power to promote religion, "so far as
is consistent with the sacred and inalienable rights of conscience, which no man is sup-
posed to give up." SIMEON HOWARD, A SERMON (1780), in THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 373 (John W. Thornton ed., Burt. Franklin reprint 1970) (1860) [hereinaf-
ter PuLPrr]. The magistrate, however, "should have power to provide for the institution
and support of the public worship of God." Id at 374. Howard thought conscientious
"liberty and freedom every man may enjoy, though the government should require him
to pay his proportion towards supporting public teachers of religion and morality." Id.
at 375. In a sermon preached on the commencement of the new Massachusetts constitu-
tion and the inauguration of the new government, Samuel Cooper exclaimed: "[W]hat a
broad foundation for the exercise of the rights of conscience is laid in this constitution!"
SAMUEL COOPER, A SERMON 29 (1780) (Evans 16753). According to Cooper, the citizens
of Massachusetts know that "it is framed upon an extent of civil and religious liberty,
unexampled perhaps in any country in the world, except America." Id. at 30. Civil gov-
ernment could encourage and maintain religion "without binding the rights of con-
science, or exerting their authority to impose articles of faith, or modes of worship; or
enforcing these by penalties." PARSONS, supra note 15, at 12-13. For other similar views,
see JOSIAH BRIDGE, A SERMON 45-46 (Mass. election sermon 1789) (Evans 21713);
HENRY CUMINGS, A SERMON 26, 46 (Mass. election sermon 1783) (Evans 17899); MosEs
HEMMENWAY, A SERMON 19, 30 (Mass. election sermon 1784) (Evans 18526); JOSEPH
HUNTINGTON, GOD RULING THE NATIONS FOR THE MOST GLORIOUS ENDS 13, 29 (Conn.
election sermon 1784) (Evans 18530); SAMUEL LANGDON, THE REPUBLIC OF THE ISRAE-
LITES AN EXAMPLE TO THE AMERICAN STATES 47-48 (N.H. election sermon 1788) (Evans
21192); CHANDLER ROBBINS, A SERMON 37 (Mass. election sermon 1791) (Evans 23741);
EZRA STILES, THE UNITED STATES ELEVATED TO GLORY AND HONOR 54-55 (Conn. election
sermon 1783) (Evans 18198); WILLIAM SYMMES, A SERMON 16 (Mass. election sermon
1785) (Evans 19269); DAVID TAPPAN, A SERMON 23 (Mass. election sermon 1792) (Evans
24841); WILLIAM WELSTEED, THE DIGNITY AND DUTY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE 18 (Mass.
election sermon 1751) (Evans 6793); ABRAHAM WILLIAMS, A SERMON I I (Mass. election
sermon 1762) (Evans 9310).
Even in England, there was liberty of conscience, and Americans knew this. For exam-
ple, in 1726, Peter Thacher said that in England there was "a just liberty of conscience
to Protestant Dissenters." PETER THACHER, WISE AND GOOD CIVIL RULERS 25 (Mass. elec-
tion sermon 1726) (Evans 2816). In 1747, the Synod of Philadelphia and the Second
Presbyterian Congregation described liberty of conscience as "the Valuable & distin-
guishing privilege of Every British Subject." 1 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES (1st ser.) 743-
45, quoted in GuY S. KLETr, PRESBYTERIANS IN COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA 244 (1937).
Note that there were different types of establishment. Some of the persons cited here
favored the establishment of Christianity or Protestantism rather than of a particular
denomination. Such persons tended to point out that they did not want establishment
of any particular sect or mode of worship, and some of them even described themselves
as opposed to establishments. For purposes of this Article, however, state tax support
for Christianity or Protestantism will be considered an establishment.
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members of establishments held that individuals possessed an ina-
lienable right to the free exercise of religion according to con-
science. Establishment writers also frequently wrote that religion or
the exercise of religion was based on an authority higher than the
civil government8 4 and, increasingly, even that civil government
could only act with respect to civil interests.8 5 These were common
84. In 1783, the Episcopal clergy of Maryland quoted the religion clause of their
state's constitution and then declared, inter alia, that their Church had the right, in com-
mon with other Christian Churches, "to have the full enjoyment and free exercise of
those purely spiritual powers . . . which, being derived only from CHRIST and His
Apostles, are to be maintained, independent of every foreign, or other, jurisdiction, so
far as may be consistent with the civil rights of society." A Declaration of Certain Fundamen-
tal Rights and Liberties of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Maryland, in I STOKES, supra note
54, at 741. They confirmed this statement in 1790. In Vermont, the Rev. Powers
preached:
But we are not to suppose any are bound to be subject to any law or govern-
ment, in any article against the rights of conscience. The holy martyrs of
Jesus have ever submitted to the civil laws of the government they lived
under, acknowledging their bodies and estates belonged to the king, or em-
peror, but their consciences they held free.
PETER POWERS, A SERMON 25 (Vt. election sermon 1778) (Evans 16019). He also said:
"ecclesiastical power is wholly of a spiritual nature, and no ways connected with either
civil or military power. Christ's kingdom is not of this world, not of a worldly nature." Id at
15. Moses Hemmenway said that "we may think, and speak, and act, and use our spiri-
tual privileges with all freedom, according to the measures of wisdom and grace given to
us; nor may any human authority forbid or restrain us from it." HEMMENWAY, supra note
83, at 25. Yet he also said: "It is true, the interests of society require subordination:
but this deprives none of liberty, but helps all to enjoy it better." Id. at 27. According to
Aaron Hutchinson,
By no means would I urge civil rulers to bind conscience in the chains of
their decrees. Christ alone is Lord of the conscience: and every man must
act for himself in all matters wherein conscience may be obliged .... But it
is folly and stupidity for a man to plead conscience for breaking the moral
law, which is a transcript of the moral perfections of God, and written upon
the hearts of all by nature.
AARON HUTcHINSON, A WELL TEMPERED SELF-LOVE A RULE OF CONDUCT TOWARDS
OTHERS 37-38 (Vt. const. convention sermon 1779) (Evans 15855).
85. Although, in the 1770s and 1780s, some Americans defended establishments on
the ground that religion itself was a concern of the civil government, proponents of
establishments increasingly justified religious legislation by arguing that civil authority
had a civil interest in religion-that the civil government had to regulate and encourage
morality and that religion, especially Protestantism, was a necessary prop to morality.
Among others, Backus noted a shift in establishment arguments:
[W]hen it comes to be calmly represented that religion is a voluntary obedience
unto God which therefore force cannot promote, how soon do they shift the
scene and tell us that religious liberty is fully allowed to us only the state
have in their wisdom thought fit to tax all the inhabitants to support an order
of men for the good of civil society. A little while ago it was for religion...
but now 'tis to maintain civility.
IsAAC BACKUS, An Appeal to the Public (1773), in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVIN-
ISM, supra note 74, at 324. He also wrote: "[Slome plead that if rulers have no right to
establish any way of religious worship for its own sake, they have a right to do it for the
good of civil society." IsAAc BACKUS, Policy as Well as Honesty (1779), in BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 375. The change in establishment
arguments, however, should not be thought to have occurred uniformly about 1770.
For example, in 1749, in Connecticut, Elihu Hall said: "Contribution for the support of
the Gospel . . . 'tis a thing of meer civil & temporal Concernment, and therefore proper
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assumptions among a broad range of Americans, including support-
ers of establishments with rather limited notions of religious
liberty.8
6
That the free exercise of religion was a minimal degree of liberty
already largely conceded by establishments was understood by dis-
senters, who sought a more extensive freedom than mere guaran-
tees of the natural right of free exercise. Against the
establishments, many dissenters argued for an equality of civil
rights, regardless of religious belief. More broadly, they took one of
Locke's arguments further than Locke himself: If the civil authority
had no power over any but civil matters, then it had to refrain, not
merely from penalizing the free exercise of religion, but from mak-
ing any laws respecting religion. 87 It was these liberties-an equal-
ity of civil rights and an absence of laws respecting religion-that
dissenters sought and that establishments could not accept. Thus,
dissenters were seeking, and establishments were opposing, reli-
gious rights far more extensive than free exercise-which was the
one religious freedom upon which dissenters and establishments
could easily agree.
B. Exemption
Whether claiming free exercise or a broader religious liberty, dis-
senters-particularly politically active and influential dissenters-
tended not to ask for a right of exemption from religiously objec-
tionable civil laws. Just as establishment writers could acknowledge
that religion was based on an authority higher than the civil govern-
ment,88 so too dissenters typically could admit that natural liberty
was protected only through submission to civil government and its
laws. According to vast numbers of Americans, individuals in the
state of nature had a liberty that was free from civil restraints but
was insecure; therefore, said these Americans, individuals sought
protection for their natural liberty by establishing civil government.
Liberty could only be obtained by submission to the civil laws of
civil government.8
9
One reason late eighteenth-century ideas about religious freedom
did not seem to require a general religious exemption is that the
Matter for civil Compact." ELIHU HALL, THE PRESENT WAY OF THE COUNTRY 52 (1749)
(Evans 6328). Of course, the argument that religious establishments were useful for
civil reasons was very old.
86. See BERNS, supra note 2, at 2.
87. See infra note 117.
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. West points out that eighteenth-century Americans assumed that freedom was
thought to be obtained through law and government. West, supra note 2, at 624-25.
Backus wrote: "[I]t is so far from being necessary for any man to give up any part of his
real liberty in order to submit to government that all nations have found it necessary to
submit to some government in order to enjoy any liberty and security at all." ISAAC
BACKUS, An Appeal to the Public (1773), in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM,
supra note 74, at 312. Incidentally, he also wrote, "nor are the people bound by any
laws, but such as they have in like manner assented to, for their common good." IsAAc
BACKUS, Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, 1779, § 7, in BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 488.
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jurisdiction of civil government and the authority of religion were
frequently considered distinguishable. It should not be assumed
that late eighteenth-century Americans viewed religion as being
necessarily in tension with civil authority. In fact, many Americans,
especially dissenters seeking an expansion of religious liberty, re-
peatedly spoke of civil authority as if it could be differentiated from
the scope of religion or religious freedom. 90 This assumption is ap-
parent in the language of the First Amendment, which begins,
90. According to Professor Buckley, Virginia Baptists, "in the tradition of Roger
Williams and Isaac Backus ... wanted what may be fairly termed a separation of church
and state based on the distinctive difference between these two spheres of man's activity
and the need to maintain a pure church." THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN
REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1784, at 176 (1977). In 1776, the "largely Presbyte-
rian" Prince Edward County petitioned that Virginia "define accurately between civil
and ecclesiastic authority; then leave our LordJesus Christ the Honour of being the Sole
Law giver and Governor in his Church." JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIR-
GINIA, 1776, at 7, quoted in HJ. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIR-
GINIA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 46 (DaCapo Press 1971)
(1910). The Presbyterians of Hanover, Virginia, regretted that "the distinction between
matter purely religious and the objects of human legislation" had been confounded.
Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (May 1784), in AMERI-
CAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 101. According to Backus: "And where these two
kinds of government, and the weapons which belong to them are well distinguished and
improved according to the true nature and end of their institution.., they do not at all
interfere with each other." ISAAC BACKUS, An Appeal to the Public (1773), in BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 315. Comparing taxation to support
religion with British taxation of the colonists, Backus wrote: "Can three thousand miles
possibly fix such limits to taxing power as the difference between civil and sacred mat-
ters has already done? One is only a difference of space, the other is so great a difference
in the nature of things .... " Id. at 339. Samuel Stillman, a Baptist, cited Locke: "I
esteem it, says the justly celebrated Mr. Locke, above all things, necessary to distinguish
exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just
bounds that lie between the one and the other." STILLMAN, supra note 15, at 22; see also
id. at 21, 33. In Connecticut, Ebenezer Frothingham wrote that "the civil and ecclesiasti-
cal Rule, each standing in their Lot, they will never clash or interfere with one another
through Time or Eternity." EBENEZER FROTHINGHAM, THE ARTICLES OF FAITH AND PRAC-
TICE 297 (1750) (Evans 6504). According to Levi Hart,
Admitting that an exact determination of the boundaries between the rights
of conscience, and of the magistrate, may be difficult, in some cases-the
most important and practical principles, on the subject, are extremely plain;
and are admitted by the most enlightened, of every denomination, as essen-
tial to good order and happiness in society.
LEVI HART, THE DESCRIPTION OF A GOOD CHARACTER 23 (Conn. election sermon 1786)
(Evans 19699); see also ELEAZER WHEELOCK, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 15 (1775 N.H.
Thanksgiving sermon, 1776) (Evans 15220).
Establishment writers sometimes emphasized the religious aspect of morality. For ex-
ample, in his "Landholder" essays, written in favor of ratification of the United States
Constitution, Oliver Ellsworth wrote: "I would not deny that the civil power has a right,
in some cases, to interfere in matters of religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish
gross immoralities and impieties; ... I heartily approve of our laws against drunkenness,
profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 32, at 500, quoted in 1 STOKES, supra note 54, at 535. By categorizing moral regula-
tion as religious regulation, establishment writers could show the necessity of the latter
and thereby could help justify what really was threatened-not common moral regula-
tion but tax support for religion. Dissenters easily responded that morals were not only
1992] 937
"Congress shall make no law." 9 1 Rather than suppose that civil laws
will in some respects prohibit the free exercise of religion and that
exemptions will be necessary, the First Amendment assumes Con-
gress can avoid enacting laws that prohibit free exercise. So too, it
assumes Congress can avoid making laws respecting the establish-
ment of religion.
In explaining the difference between religious and civil matters,
Americans of the last half of the eighteenth century employed sev-
eral different formulations. Locke had argued that individuals en-
trusted civil government with the security of "temporal goods" and
"the things of this life" but that "the care of each man's soul, and
the things of heaven.., is left entirely to every man's self."9 2 Simi-
larly, many Americans differentiated between the temporal and the
spiritual, between "this world" and "the Kingdom of Christ."
93
Americans also sometimes listed the things that civil authority could
not establish or determine. Typically, they mentioned religious be-
lief and doctrine-what Locke had called "speculative opinions. 9 4
Occasionally, they also specified the internal governance of a sect
and its mode or form of worship.95
the subject of religious belief but also were temporal and thus a matter of civil concern.
See, e.g., supra note 15.
91. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
92. LOCKE, supra note 27, at 48, 49.
93. For example, in a Massachusetts election sermon, Abraham Williams explained
that "[t]he Constitution, Laws and Sanctions of civil Society respect this World, and are
therefore essentially distinct and different from the Kingdom of Christ, which is not of this
World." WILLIAMS, supra note 83, at 8. Abraham Booth wrote: "If all the subjects of
Christ be real saints, it may be justly queried whether any National religious establishment
can be a part of his kingdom." ABRAHAM BOOTH, AN ESSAY ON THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST
38-39 (1791) (Evans 23213). Booth asked: "[I]s it not plain, that a National church is
inimical to the spirit of our Lord's declaration. My kingdom is not of this world? Does not
that... saying compel us to view the church and the world in a contrasted point of light?"
Id. at 39. According to Booth, "[s]ecular kingdoms are under the direction of human
laws, which are frequently weak, partial, and unjust--or laws which, when least imper-
fect, extend their obliging power no further than the exterior behavior." Id. at 70; see
also Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (Apr. 25, 1777), in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 98; Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover...
(Oct. 1784), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 109. The view that civil gov-
ernment could only regulate visible, exterior, or public morality frequently was stated in
language drawn from the works of Warburton.
94. LOCKE, supra note 27, at 45. For examples of Americans who discussed belief,
doctrine, or opinion, see infra note 95.
95. One New Englander wrote: "That the civil authority have no power to establish
any religion (i.e. any professions of faith, modes of worship, or church government) of a
human form and composition, as a rule binding to Christians; much less may they do
this on any penalties whatsoever." [ELISHA WILLIAMS], THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIB-
ERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (1744), in POLITICIAL SERMONS OF THE FOUNDING ERA 1730-
1805, at 72 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991); see also ZABDIEL ADAMS, A SERMON 41 (Mass. elec-
tion sermon 1782) (Evans 17450) (regarding, inter alia, modes and forms of religion and
sentiment concerning doctrines); ROBERT BRAGGE, CHURCH DISCIPLINE 38-39 (1768)
(Evans 10846) (regarding ceremonial law, doctrine, worship, and discipline); Memorial of
Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (1784), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,
supra note 80, at I I 1 (regarding, inter alia, articles of faith not essential to the preserva-
tion of society, modes of worship, and internal government of religious communities);
EBENEZER FROTHINGHAM, A KEY TO UNLOCK THE DOOR 154 (1767) (Evans 6504) (regard-
ing, inter alia, church membership, place of worship, who is qualified to choose a minis-
ter, and who shall preach or be a minister); ISRAEL HOLLY, A WORD IN ZION'S BEHALF 7
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Americans tended to adhere to their distinction between the ob-
jects of civil authority and those of religion, even when discussing
temporal matters that were the subject of religious opinions. Dis-
senters sometimes acknowledged the existence of matters that were
the object of both religious and civil concerns and stressed that civil
government could not regulate such matters as were exclusively reli-
gious. 96 So too, establishment ministers occasionally said that some
matters were both temporal and religious but emphasized that civil
government could regulate the temporal aspect of these.97 Sup-
porters of establishments could afford to take this position because
they also frequently argued that civil government had a legitimate
civil or temporal interest in supporting religion.9 8 Some dissenters
responded by arguing that civil government could not treat sects
unequally. Some even argued that government could not legislate
with respect to religion-that it simply could not take cognizance of
religion.99 It was on these issues that dissenters and proponents of
establishments increasingly tended to disagree, not on the general-
ization that civil government only had authority over civil or tempo-
ral matters.
The assumption that religious liberty would not, or at least should
not, affect civil authority over civil matters was so widely held that a
general right of religious exemption rarely became the basis for seri-
ous controversy. Of course, some dissenters did broadly claim reli-
gious exemption from objectionable civil laws, on grounds of
freedom of conscience or even divine command. Their claims, how-
ever, illustrate the marginal character of the support for a general
right of religious exemption.' 00 For example, John Bolles-a
Rogerene-apparently claimed some religious exemption from civil
([1765]) (Evans 10005) (regarding articles of faith, creeds, forms of worship, and church
government).
96. For example, Israel Holly wrote: "It is true, we are to render to Cesar [sic] the
Things that are Cesar's. But then we ought to be very careful that we don't render that
to Cesar, which is due to God alone." HOLLY, supra note 95, at 6. Noah Hobart
preached: "I trust they [i.e., establishment churches or ministers] will always be far...
from desiring you to inflict temporal Punishments on such as they censure for Faults that
are merely Ecclesiastical in their Nature, and do not affect the Peace and Happiness of Civil
Society." NOAH HOBART, CIVIL GOVERNMENT THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL HAPPINESS 42
(Conn. election sermon 1751) (Evans 6692). See also the quotation of the petition from
Prince Edward County, Virginia, supra note 90.
97. For example, the Rev. Zabdiel Adams preached: "But that part of religion which
has an immediate aspect on the good of the community falls under the cognizance of the
ruler." Z. ADAMS, supra note 95, at 42-43; see also STONE, supra note 15, at 25.
98. See supra note 85.
99. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
100. Eighteenth-century Quakers could not always conform to the demands of civil
laws and frequently spoke about their consequent suffering in terms of "conscience."
Yet they clearly failed to have their claims of conscience protected even in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution. After mid-century, moreover, particularly after 1776, Quakers re-
treated from politics and tended not to participate in the struggles for liberalizing
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laws. In defense of two Quaker women who "went naked... one
into a Meeting, the other ... through the Streets of Salem," Bolles
wrote that "they did it in Submission to a divine Power ... as a
Sign."'' For precedent, he cited the Bible, saying simply: "Isaiah
went Naked."' 10 2 This was not, however, the sort of analysis that
most late eighteenth-century Americans found persuasive with re-
spect to constitutional law.' 03
Although other dissenters, less extreme than Bolles, did seek ex-
emption from civil laws, they typically asked, not for a general right
of exemption, but merely for exemptions from a small number of
specified civil obligations. Of these limited exemptions, moreover,
only those relating to military service frequently were granted in
constitutions. 04 Even constitutional military exemptions, however,
often appear to have been given largely for reasons of compassion
general constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. On the Quaker retreat from poli-
tics, see JACK D. MARIETrA, THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN QUAKERISM, 1748-1783
(1984); WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833, at 595 (1971).
101. JOHN BOLLES, To WORSHIP GOD IN SPIRIT 116-17 (1756) [hereinafter BOLLES,
To WORSHIP GOD IN SPIRIT]. To this, Jacob Johnson replied in outrage:
I should not have mentioned, these monstrous Practices... had I not found
Friend Bolles justifying of them as Things innocent, & lawful. And which, it
seems with him, are such cases of Conscience, and of so sacred, and religious
a Nature, that the civil Magistrate hath nothing to do with 'em ....
JACOB JOHNSON, ANIMADVERSIONS, in BOLLES, supra, at 29. Bolles answered that "Isaiah
went Naked" and that the women went naked as "Signs." JOHN BOLLES, A REPLY, in
BOLLES, To WORSHIP GOD IN SPIRIT, supra at 28. After discussing laws concerning reli-
gion, Bolles quoted Timothy: "The Law is not madefor a Righteous Man, but saith he,for the
Lawless, and Disobedient, for the Ungodly, and for Sinners .. " BOLLES, To WORSHIP GOD IN
SPIRIT, supra, at 106 (quoting I Timothy 1:9). On the Quaker practice of going naked as
a sign, see RICHARD BAUMAN, LET YOUR WORDS BE FEW--SYMBOLISM OF SPEAKING AND
SILENCE AMONG SEVENTEENTH CENTURY QUAKERS 84-94 (1983).
102. See supra note 101.
103. For a sample of Bolles at his fervent best:
By the Scriptures thus it is Proved, that all the established Worship of New
England, defended by the worldly Powers, is nothing but the Worship of the
Dragon, and the Beast, and his Image; and also proved that the Power, Seat,
and Authority given to the Beast, or worldly Powers, by the Dragon; is the
power, and seat of Persecution to defend the said Worship, given to the Im-
age of the Beast.
BOLLES, To WORSHIP GOD IN SPIRIT, supra note 101, at 113-14. Johnson mocked his
opponent: "Friend Bolles has drawn out his Discourse to so great a length, fetching his
Evidence from the Dragon, the Beast, &c. How he has Succeeded, How clear his Proofs,
& how just his Application... I leave to the Reader to judge (if any has the patience to
Read it) .... " JOHNSON, ANIMADVERSIONS, supra note 101, at 29. Johnson clearly was
embarrassed at having been drawn into debate with Bolles, "Who has been Writing and
Practicing against the civil Governments, and Churches of Boston, & Connecticut, for more
than 30 Years past; and no Body has taken so much Notice of it, as to give him an
Answer." Id. at 1. Indeed, Bolles complained of his failure to provoke attention, and
friends of Johnson advised him "to take no public Notice of him." Id.
The Rogerenes deliberately interrupted church services, but even they could be
equivocal about claiming exemptions. See Petition of John Rogers and Timothy
Wolverhouse to Connecticut General Assembly (Sept. 28, 1769), reprinted in THE PITKIN
PAPERS: CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS DURING WILLIAM PITKIN'S GOVERNORSHIP OF
THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 1766-1769, at 207 (1921).
104. See supra notes 57, 64 and accompanying text. Many Americans described ex-
emption from a religious test or from a religious assessment as a religious right or as
deserving of constitutional recognition. Yet these were exemptions from laws directly
concerning religion. See supra notes 66 - 68 and accompanying text.
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and politics.10 5
Indeed, the idea that individuals had a general right to be ex-
empted from civil laws contrary to their consciences was so unpopu-
lar that establishment writers attempted to use it to smear their
opponents. By citing lurid stories about the sixteenth-century
Anabaptists of Miinster and by attributing the enthusiasms of ex-
tremists to dissenters as a whole, establishment writers could accuse
dissenters of attempting to subvert all civil liberty.106 For example,
in support of Connecticut's religious establishment, Elihu Hall said
that persons objecting to that establishment on grounds of con-
science were making arguments that would justify nonpayment of
civil taxes or breach of contract: "Thus a man may plead Con-
science for the support or excuse of all the moral Dishonesty and
Promise & Covenant-breaking in the World. But men have no Right
to be their own Judges in their own Case in moral Matters, and
where their neighbors Interest is equally concerned with their
own."1
0 7
105. Incidentally, Backus sought a constitutional right that "no man ought to be com-
pelled to bear arms, who conscientiously scruples the lawfulness of it, if he will pay such
equivalent." ISAAC BACKUS, Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, 1779,
§ 7, in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 488. In North Caro-
lina, it was urged "That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead."
N.C. Proposal for a Declaration of Rights, § 19, in 4 JONOTHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244
(1941). See generally McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1468-69. These formulations,
which were very common, indicate that a substantial number of Americans were willing
in their constitutions to provide exemptions from military service but not from taxes or
other payments in support of war.
Note that an exemption from the requirement of a nondenominational oath may have
been considered an exemption from civil law. This issue, however, often was resolved
without resort to exemptions. See supra note 64.
In various states, ministers were not taxed and were denied the right to vote. Leland
opposed the tax exemption on the ground that civil authority should be silent about
religion. See infra note 120.
106. "Even to this day they can hardly preach a sermon or write a pamphlet for infant
baptism without having something to say about the madmen of Minster who, they tell
us, rebelled against their civil rulers." IsAAc BACKUS, An Appeal to the Public (1773), in
BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 337; see also IsAAc BACKUS,
A Door Opened for Equal Christian Liberty (1783), in BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CAL-
VINISM, supra note 74, at 431.
107. HALL, supra note 85, at 59 (1749). A situation in which individuals were judges
in their own case was one of the nonhistorical definitions of the state of nature.
The charges faced by Baptists and other dissenters may be further illustrated by a
group of three pamphlets published together in 1762. In the first, Alexander Gardon
described a man who told his wife's family that he had divine instructions to leave his
wife for his youngest sister in law. "[T]he old man [the wife's father] took his Youngest
Daughter by the Hand, and gave her to the Prophet to Wife, and he went in unto her
and lay with her without any further ceremony, pursuant to his Revelation." The family
eventually had a shoot-out with the constable and the militia. This instructive tale is
followed by a reminder of the dangers of enthusiasm and impulses. ALEXANDER
GARDON, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE DELUDED DUTARTRES (1762) (Evans 9120). The sec-
ond pamphlet was a lurid tale of an impulsive, secular murder followed by repentance.
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To defend themselves from such accusations, dissenters who
sought an expanded religious liberty disavowed a right of exemp-
tion from civil laws.' 08 Writing against the Connecticut establish-
ment, Ebenezer Frothingham argued that no "hurt" would be done
to "any man's civil interest, by different sects worshipping God in
different places in the same town." 109 Eight different sects might
live together in one community, but none, he observed, would be
exempt: "If any person of ... these professions breaks the law, he
lies open to punishment, equally so, as if there was but one profes-
sion in the town.""10 Frothingham was not alone. Other influential
dissenters also rejected a right of exemption."'
A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE... OFJOHN LEWIS (1762). The third was a lengthy criticism of
reliance on "inward light." Among other things, this attack associated separatists who
generally conformed to the civil law with Rogerenes, who were willing to breach civil
law: "Now what Law of God requires you to separate from our Churches?... What Law
requires you [Rogerenes] to disturb Churches ... on the Lord's Day?. . . Do you think
that no Respect is due to civil Authority?" ROBERT Ross, A PLAIN ADDRESS TO THE
QUAKERS, MORAVIANS, SEPARATISTS, SEPARATE-BAPTISTS, ROGERENES, AND OTHER ENTHU-
SIASTS 182 [1762] (bracketed reference to Rogerenes in original).
108. Contra McConnell, Origins, supra note 3, at 1447.
109. FROTHINGHAM, supra note 95, at 154.
110. Id. at 155.
111. On the ground that Leland did not support obedience to all laws, McConnell
assumes Leland supported exemption from civil laws. McConnell, Origins, supra note 3,
at 1447. Leland, however, explicitly opposed exemptions from civil laws. Although
Baptists had religious objections to contracts between a minister and his flock, Leland
nonetheless argued that such contracts, if made, were enforceable. Moreover, "To in-
dulge [ministers] with an exemption from taxes and bearing arms is a tempting emolu-
ment. The law should be silent about them; protect them as citizens, not as sacred
officers, for the civil law knows no sacred religious officers." JOHN LELAND, The Rights of
Conscience Inalienable, and, Therefore, Religious Opinions Not Cognizable by Law (1791) in THE
WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 188 (N.Y. 1845) [hereinafter WRITINGS].
For Leland, conscience provided no legal objection to law that was silent about religion.
Leland told various stories about claims of exemption:
A Shaking-Quaker, in a violent manner, cast his wife into a mill-pond in cold
weather; his plea was, that God ordered him so to do. Now the question is,
Ought he not to be punished as much as if he had done the deed in anger?
Was not the abuse to the woman as great? Could the magistrate perfectly
know whether it was God Satan, or ill-will, that prompted him to do the
deed? The answers to these questions are easy.
In the year of 1784, Matthew Womble, of Virginia, killed his wife and four
sons, in obedience to a Shining One... to merit heaven by the action ....
Neither his motive, which was obedience, nor his object, which was the salva-
tion of his soul had any weight on the jury.
JOHN LELAND, The Yankee Spy (1794), in WRITINGS, supra, at 228. Incidentally, it should
not be thought that Leland opposed exemption only for illegal acts of violence. Appar-
ently assuming that he was addressing the question of exemption, Leland also told a
story about "two women ... brought before the sessions for fornication"-one of whom
was "a church member" and the other of whom was not. "She who was a daughter of
Zion was pitied ... but she who was not a member of the church, was judged a lewd
slattern, and was driven out of the parish .. " Id.
Samuel Stillman said that "The subjects of this [i.e., Christ's] kingdom are bound by
no laws in matters of religion, but such as they receive from Christ .. STILLMAN,
supra note 15, at 27-28. He also said:
This kingdom does not in any respects interfere with civil government;
rather tends to promote its peace and happiness, because its subjects are
taught to obey magistracy ....
The subjects of the kingdom of Christ, claim no exemption from the just
authority of the magistrate, by virtue of their relation to it. Rather they yield
a ready and chearful obedience, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.
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Of course, proponents of establishments did not advocate a right
of religious exemption from civil laws,'1 2 but neither did the vast
And should any of them violate the laws of the state, they are to be punished
as other men.
ld at 27.
In 1780, Backus noted that his opponents "have raked up the German Anabaptists
whom they represent as 'pleading conscience for lying with each other's wives, and for
murdering their peaceable neighbors.'" ISAAC BACKUS, An Appeal to the People (1780), in
BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 74, at 393-94. He went on to say:
"And all this without producing so much as a single word from all our writings to prove
their charges against us." Id. at 395. After complaining about the new Massachusetts
establishment, Backus said: "I challenge all our opponents to prove, if they can, that we
have ever desired any other religious liberty, than to have this partiality entirely re-
moved." Id, at 396. Backus wrote "the state is armed with the sword to guard the peace
and the civil rights of all persons and societies and to punish those who violate the
same." Id. at 315. On the Baptists' deference to law, see McLOUGHLIN, supra note 100,
at 753.
In a pastoral letter of 1783, the synod of the Presbyterian Church in New York and
Pennsylvania noted that the rights of conscience had been secured and given constitu-
tional protection: "The duty which you owe to the community at large for this inestima-
ble blessing is to support civil authority, by being subject not only 'for wrath, but also
for conscience' sake,' and by living 'quiet and peaceable lives in all godliness and hon-
esty.'" See 1 STOKES, supra note 54, at 445. In its confession of faith, the Presbyterian
Church in the United States declared: "Infidelity or difference in religion, doth not
make void the magistrate's just and legal authority, nor free the people from their due
obedience to him." THE CONSTrrTUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 36 (adopted by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia 1788)
(1792) (Evans 24711); see also id. at 30. The Rules of Church Government of the Dutch
Reformed Church began its section "of Christian Discipline" by warning that "christian
discipline is spiritual, and exempts no person from the judgement and punishment of
the civil power." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REFORMED DUTCH CHURCH, IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 190 (1793) (Evans 26065) (the Rules were first adopted in 1619).
When the Methodist Episcopal Church met in Baltimore in 1784 it required members of
that sect to liberate their slaves, but added: "These rules are to affect the members of
our Society no further than as they are consistent with the laws of the States in which
they reside." See 2 STOKES, supra note 54, at 135. Of course, the Presbyterians of New
York and Pennsylvania and the Dutch of New York were dissenters merely in the sense
that they were not established churches in their states.
112. See quotations in supra note 84. Consider also the following. In 1789, George
Washington wrote to American Catholics that "[a]s mankind becomes more liberal, they
will be more able to allow that those who conduct themselves as worthy members of the
community are equally entitled to the protection of civil government." See I STOKES,
supra note 54, at 496. To the Quakers, he was slightly more explicit:
The liberty enjoyed by the people of these States, of worshipping Al-
mighty God agreeably to their consciences, is... among the choicest.., of
their rights. While men perform their social duties faithfully, they do all that
society or the state can with propriety demand or expect; and remain re-
sponsible only to their Maker for the religion, or modes of faith, which they
may prefer or profess.
Your principles and conduct are well known to me; and it is doing the
people called Quakers no more than justice to say, that (except their declin-
ing to share with others the burthen of the common defence) there is no
denomination among us, who are more exemplary and useful citizens.
I assure you very explicitly, that in my opinion the conscientious scruples
of all men should be treated with great delicacy and tenderness; and it is my
wish and desire, that the laws may always be as extensively accommodated to
them, as a due regard to the protection and essential interests of the nation
may justify and permit.
1992] 943
majority of dissenters. Although some dissenters asked for grants
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 416 n.54 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939); see
also BISSETr, supra note 28, app. at 12; Jonathan Law's speech to the [Conn.] General
Assembly (May 1742), in THE WOLCOTr PAPERS: CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS
DURING ROGER WOLCOTr'S GOVERNORSHIP OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 1750-1754,
at 457 (1916); JOSEPH LYMAN, A SERMON 36-37 (Mass. election sermon 1787) (Evans
20469); STONE, supra note 15, at 23; SAMUEL WEST, A SERMON 27 (Mass. election sermon
1786) (Evans 20142).
Also relevant are numerous statements, not focusing on conscience, but generally
stating the need for conformity to law. The Rev. Jonas Clarke preached that:
In a word, as by the social compact, the whole is engaged for the protec-
tion and defense of the life, liberty and property of each individual; so each
individual owes all that he hath, even life itself, to the support, protection
and defence of the whole, when the exigencies of the state require it. And
no man, whether in authority or subordination, can justly excuse himself
from any duty, service or exertions, in peace or war, that may be necessary
for the publick peace, liberty, safety or defence, when lawfully and constitu-
tionally called thereto.
JONAS CLARKE, A SERMON 29 (Mass. election sermon 1781) (Evans 17114). Zabdiel Ad-
ams said of kings and magistrates: "Whilst they keep within constitutional limits they
cannot be resisted with impunity. Disobedience to such, exposes both to temporal and
eternal punishments." Z. ADAMS, supra note 95, at 7-8. According to Henry Cumings:
"And when people, under pretence of liberty, refuse obedience to lawful authority, and
oppose the measures ofjust government, merely because such measures do not coincide
with their private views and separate interests, the principles on which they act, are evi-
dently inconsistent with a state of society, and lead directly back to a state of nature."
CUMINGS, supra note 83, at 13. Chandler Robbins argued:
All power originating in the people, will, by no means justify individuals, or a
small part of the community, in refusing obedience to laws which they may
think oppressive.-They have an indisputable right, with a decent, and
manly firmness, to represent their grievances, and to remonstrate to govern-
ment, in a suitable manner.
ROBBINS, supra note 83, at 28. According to William Symmes, "if those who 'rule over
men must be just, ruling in the fear of God;' then no person can plead an exemption
from the duty of submission to wise and just government." SYMMES, supra note 83, at
17. For further discussion of obedience to civil laws, see DAN FOSTER, AN ELECTION
SERMON 10 (1789 Vt. election sermon, 1790) (Evans 22505); AMMI R. ROBBINS, THE
EMPIRES AND DOMINIONS OF THIS WORLD 22 (Conn. election sermon 1789) (Evans
22118); SAMUEL WALES, THE DANGERS OF OUR NATIONAL PROSPERITY 22, 35 (Conn. elec-
tion sermon 1785) (Evans 19359); SAMUEL WEBSTER, A SERMON 14 (Mass. election ser-
mon 1777) (Evans 15703).
Ministers sometimes "recommended" religion to the civil authorities on the ground
that religion encouraged obedience to civil laws. See, e.g., NATHAN STRONG, A SERMON 15
(Conn. election sermon 1790) (Evans 22913). As if to verify this, large numbers of elec-
tion sermons contained statements, citing the Bible, that individuals should submit to
government-not only for fear of wrath but also on account of conscience. For example,
the Rev. G.C. Lyman said: "We must needs be subject not only for fear of the wrath
which they will execute on us, but for conscience sake. It is a most inconsistent and
distracted piece of conduct, to set up rulers, and then disobey their just & needful
laws .... G.C. LYMAN, supra note 28, at 19. Both dissenting and establishment minis-
ters tended to mention this wrath and conscience line. Quotations and paraphrases of
the passage occurred so frequently that it was almost a convention.
Occasionally, some Americans analyzed the right to resist political oppression in
terms of "conscience." The difficulty was to explain that Americans could not conscien-
tiously disobey law in ordinary circumstances. Typically, discussions of this problem
distinguished between conscientious resistance to tyranny and the need to submit to the
more or less just laws of governments formed by consent. Some of these political dis-
cussions accepted a greater degree of conscientious resistance to civil law than did dis-
cussions that focused on religious liberty. The following illustrates the genre:
Seeing Political Rulers derive their Authorityfrom CHRIST, and rule under
him, this teaches us, that it is the unquestionable Duty of the People to submit to
them, and that for Conscience sahe.-That is to say, unless they shall so pervert
their Authority, as to decree and administer in such manner, as has a direct
tendency to overthrow the Protestant Religion, or to deprive the People of
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of exemption from a few specified civil obligations, such as military
service, dissenters typically did not demand a general exemption
from objectionable civil laws, let alone a constitutional right to such
an exemption."13 If the myriad and voluble dissenters who sought
an expansion of religious freedom were advocating a general consti-
tutional right of religious exemption from civil laws, it is remarkable
their Liberty and Property; or, in a Word; unless they violate their Oath, and
appear no other but as Enemies to the civil and religious Constitution.
SAMUEL PHILLIPS, POLITICAL RULERS AuTHORIZ'D AND INFLUENC'D 33 (Mass. election ser-
mon 1759) (Evans 6593); see also ELIZUR GOODRICH, THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL UNION 25
(Conn. election sermon 1787) (Evans 20393); SIMEON HOWARD, A SERMON PREACHED TO
THE ANCIENT AND HONORABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY IN BOSTON (1773), in 1 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING 189 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983); WILLIAM
MORISON, A SERMON 7-8 (N.H. election sermon 1792) (Evans 24563); JOSIAH WHITNEY,
THE ESSENTIAL REQUISrrIES TO FORM THE GOOD RULER'S CHARACTER 24 (Conn. election
sermon 1788) (Evans 21601).
More generally, some members of establishments said that Americans were obliged to
obey civil government and the law, except if the law were unjust or contrary to con-
science. Yet, given American assumptions about resistance and about the distinction
between civil and religious matters, the words of these establishment writers need not
and should not be understood to refer to a religious exemption from civil laws. For
example, William Welsteed said that magistrates "have an undoubted Right to be
obeyed in all their Laws and Orders, not repugnant to the Commands of God," but he
continued by explaining that Christianity required submission to government and that
individuals should "Render therefore to Caesar the Things that are Caesar's." WILLIAM
WELSTEED, THE DIGNrrY AND DUTY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE 40-41 (Mass. election ser-
mon 1751) (Evans 6793). Similarly, the Rev. Williams preached:
The Law of Nature, which is the Constitution of the God of Nature, is universally
obliging,--it varies not with Men's Humours or Interest, but is immutable as
the Relations of Things: Human Laws bind the Conscience only by their
Conformity hereto.-Laws ought to be plain and intelligible, consistent with
themselves,.-with Reason,-with Religion ....
WILLIAMS, supra note 83, at 23. He also spoke about submission to government. Id. at
27-28. These ministers hardly were recognizing the conscientious objections of dissent-
ers and, moreover, were addressing a right of resistance to civil government rather than
a legal right under such government.
113. For the positions of leading dissenters who advocated greater religious liberty,
see supra note 111. Note also that the two sects that played the most important role in
achieving religious liberty in Virginia, the Baptists and the Presbyterians, objected to
government support for the Episcopal Church but typically did not ask for exemptions
from civil laws. BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 176-77. Among other things, Buckley ob-
serves that Virginia's Baptists "request[ed] no favors from civil government." Id. at 176.
Civil government was "to restrain the vicious and encourage the virtuous by wholesome
laws equally extending to every individual." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the
General Assembly of Virginia (April 25, 1777), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at
97; see also Memorial of Oct. 24, 1776, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 94,
97. An anonymous Virginia dissenter said: "It is the Magistrate's province to scourge
the disobedient, and chasten the refractory to good humour and submission, let them be
of what denomination they will." THE FREEMAN'S REMONSTRANCE, supra note 36, at 5. In
New York, the sometime chaplain to the United States House of Representatives, Wil-
liam Linn, preached to the Tammany Society that "[t]he members of the Church, in-
deed, are also members of civil society, and subject to all its laws, so far as is consistent
with a good conscience; but the great evil has been in the civil magistrate usurping the
throne of Christ and exercising spiritual dominion." WILLIAM LINN, THE BLESSINGS OF
AMERICA 19 (Fourth ofJuly sermon 1791) (Evans 23504). Linn's statement is ambigu-
ous on the question of exemptions.
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that they tended not to claim such a right and that some of their
leading publicists disavowed it.
C. Establishment
In the late eighteenth century, the overwhelming majority of dis-
senters sought, not a constitutional right of exemption, but an end
to establishments. As already discussed, dissenters based their ar-
guments for greater religious liberty on the assumption that civil
authority could be compatible with religious freedom and on the
assumption that such freedom could only be secure under the civil
laws of civil government."a 4 Constitutions, they argued, should
guarantee dissenters (or at least Protestant dissenters) the same civil
rights-that is, the same secular legal rights-as other Americans,
without regard to religious differences. 1 5 These complaints of dis-
senters reflected their own circumstances. In the last half of the
eighteenth century, many Americans had unequal civil rights on ac-
count of their religious opinions; others had equal civil rights but
thought this equality precarious. Therefore, many of these Ameri-
cans wanted guarantees of equal civil rights. Of course, some
wanted equality only for Protestants or Christians. Yet a form of
equal civil rights was, increasingly, the minimum dissenters believed
was theirs by right and what they believed they could get. 116 In-
deed, some-anxious that religion not be dependent upon civil gov-
ernment-demanded that government avoid legislating with respect
to religion.' t7 If civil government was established for exclusively
civil purposes, they argued, then it had no authority to make any law
concerning religion. These anti-establishment claims-and, to a
lesser degree, the grants of exemption from a few, specified obliga-
tions-were the goals pursued by large numbers of dissenters. For
these Americans, the possibility of a general right of exemption was,
at most, a distraction from the real issues at stake.
What dissenters said about establishments, moreover, had impli-
cations for exemption. Of course, the anti-establishment demands
for equal civil rights and for the absence of laws respecting religion
were made in response to legislative or constitutional provisions
114. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
115. BUCKLEY, supra note 90, at 177; McLoUGHLIN, supra note 100, at xviii; see also
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PAS-
SAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY (1989).
116. See books cited in supra note 116. Note also that various state constitutions
contained religion clauses that reflected such claims of equality.
117. For example, the Presbyterians of Hanover, Virginia, urged that: "In the fixed
belief of this principle, that the kingdom of Christ, and the concerns of religion, are
beyond the limits of civil control, we should act a dishonest, inconsistent part, were we
to receive any emoluments from any human establishments for the support of the gos-
pel." Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover to the General Assembly of Virginia (Apr. 25, 1777),
in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 98; see also Memorial of Oct. 24, 1776, in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 94. Madison wrote "that in matters of reli-
gion no man's right is abridged by the institution of civil society, and that religion is
wholly exempt from its cognizance." James Madison, Memorial & Remonstrance, in AMERI-
CAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 80, at 121.
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that benefitted particular denominations or, more broadly, a partic-
ular religion rather than in response to claims of exemption for the
religiously scrupulous. Nonetheless, the dissenters' positions on es-
tablishment were suggestive of their position on exemption. A right
of exemption for the religiously scrupulous could be considered a
law respecting religion. It even could create unequal civil rights; in
the words of the Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom, men's
"opinions in matters of religion" shall "in no wise diminish, en-
large, or affect their civil capacities." ' 18 The sweeping language
with which so many Americans attacked establishments was not the
language of persons seeking a constitutional right of exemption.1 19
Conclusion
Did late eighteenth-century Americans understand the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the United States Constitution to provide a right of
religious exemption from civil laws? Put another way, did the Free
Exercise Clause require courts to subordinate civil law to individual
interpretations of a higher, religious duty? By examining these his-
torical questions, not only can we learn about the religious freedom
recognized in the federal Constitution but also, more broadly, we
can observe how eighteenth-century Americans perceived the rela-
tionship between their written constitutions and another, higher
source of obligation.
As it happens, the claim that the Free Exercise Clause provided a
right of exemption from civil laws depends upon evidence that may
118. HENING, COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 30, at 86.
119. This Article argues that the vast majority of dissenters were not claiming a gen-
eral constitutional right of exemption. Nonetheless, it may be asked whether dissenters
who had exemptions from particular civil obligations understood that these exemptions
may not have been in accord with what many dissenters said about establishments.
Many dissenters clung to their exemptions from particular obligations, especially if
they feared they could not obtain equality or if (as in the case of Quakers) they wanted to
avoid civil obligations to which most other Americans submitted. But the implication of
the campaign against establishments was not lost on those who wanted these exemp-
tions. Quakers were notably unenthusiastic about the anti-establishment arguments that
might have threatened their exemptions from military service. Similarly, dissenting min-
isters omitted to insist that dissenting and establishment ministers give up their nonsec-
tarian clerical exemptions from civil taxes and military service. An exception was the
Baptist, John Leland, who wrote that "[t]o indulge [ministers] with an exemption from
taxes and bearing arms is a tempting emolument. The law should be silent about them;
protect them as citizens, not sacred officers, for the civil law knows no sacred religious
officers." LELAND, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, and, Therefore, Religious Opinions Not
Cognizable by Law (1791), in WRrrINGS, supra note 111, at 188. Yet from most dissenting
ministers who sought equality and the absence of laws respecting religion, there was a
politic silence about clerical exemptions. Neither dissenting nor establishment ministers
had an interest in pointing out that these were special privileges and laws respecting
religion. Thus, clerical exemptions and exemptions from military service were accepted
even by most dissenters, notwithstanding their attacks on establishments. The possible
contradictions sometimes were publicly acknowledged but more often were conve-
niently ignored.
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be questioned. The disturb-the-peace caveats in state constitutions
specified the circumstances in which state governments could deny
religious liberty; such caveats related to the availability rather than
the extent of religious freedom and do not evince a right of exemp-
tion from civil law. Similarly, the evidence does not support the po-
sition that Madison sought a general constitutional right of religious
exemption. Moreover, that various state statutes (or even constitu-
tions) expressly granted religious exemptions from military service
and other specified civil obligations hardly suggests that such ex-
emptions were rights under the United States Constitution-let
alone that a general religious exemption from civil law was a right
under any American constitution. Last but not least, the framers
and ratifiers repeatedly said they were reluctant to leave the magni-
tude of individual freedom-including religious freedom-in the
discretion of Congress or the federal judiciary.
A more general examination of religious freedom in late eight-
eenth-century America reveals that a constitutional right of religious
exemption was not even an issue in serious contention among the
vast majority of Americans. Members of establishments increasingly
said that they favored the free exercise of religion, and they clearly
did not understand that right to include a right of exemption. So
too, the politically active and influential dissenters who sought and
obtained expanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty did
not seek a general constitutional right of exemption from civil laws.
Indeed, they expressly disavowed such a right and frequently agi-
tated for equal civil rights and an absence of laws respecting reli-
gion. In eighteenth-century America, where varied Christian sects
bickered with one another and thrived, a constitutional right to have
different civil obligations on account of religious differences was
precisely what dissenters did not demand.
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